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Introduction
Politicians often take positions that, while popular among their supporters, mobilize the opposing political camp as well. Such 'divisive politics' leaves the electorate and the party system more polarized, often without creating a clear electoral gain for the initiator. In American politics such issues are called 'wedge issues' while polarizing politics is also known as 'cultural war'. In European politics, examples can be found especially in 'third wave democracies', like Spain * National Bank of Hungary. Email: kissa@mnb.hu. Postal address: Szabadság tér 8-9., Budapest, H-1054, Hungary. Tel: +36 1 428 2600 (app. 1309). Fax: +36 1 428 2590. 1 or the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, especially related to the heritage of a past dictatorship or the rights of ethnic minorities, but also to social issues. A common feature of these examples is that the polarizing positions help to unite the governing parties as well as the opposition and that they intend to move the median voter rather than reflect a move toward her. This paper demonstrates that politicians have a strategic incentive to engage in 'divisive politics,' even if most of the direct electoral benefit accrues to their opponent. By polarizing the electorate the incumbent weakens the ability of independent voters to make him accountable for his policies in the common interest. Moreover, the analysis shows that the interests of the incumbent and the opposition are aligned: the opposition also benefits from the weakening of political accountability.
In introducing elements of ideology into the analysis of political accountability, the paper brings together two separate strands of the literature. The theoretical analysis of political accountability, initiated by the early work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , concentrates on the moral-hazard aspect of politics: the conflict of interest between citizens (principals) and politicians (agents). Examples of this conflict of interest are given by corruption and the diversion of public funds by politicians to projects of their preference. (Alternatively, one may think of politicians as investing costly effort in the efficient functioning of the state.) Voters can make the incumbent act in their interest by offering the reward of reelection in case of good outcomes.
1 Besides the moral-hazard aspect, some analyses introduced an adverse-selection element to the study of political accountability. Voters in these frameworks would like to choose the more able politicians, in addition to disciplining the incumbent. (1997) who study the effect of "checks and balances" in a political system with more than one politician responsible for a policy outcome, and Maskin and Tirole (2004) who point out the potentially negative effects of political accountabilty. For an overview of the issues related to political accountability see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) . 2 See Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Besley and Case (1995) . A detailed discussion of such models can be found in Fearon (1999) and Besley (2006) .
By focusing on the relationship between polarization and accountability, the analysis is also related to the study in political science of democracy in 'divided societies.' Early analyses emphasized 'centrifugal forces' in democracies with multiple ethnicities (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972) , while much of the recent literature focuses on institutional arrangements that have the potential to tame those forces (Lijphart, 2004; Reilly, 2001) . In relation with this literature the analysis brings to the fore that political accountability hinges crucially on the presence of independent voters. Accountability is weakened by cleavages in the electorate and even by what could be called the 'market power' of political parties.
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The formal analysis of the paper is most closely related to Besley (2006, pp. 124-128) who studies a political accountability game with 'partisan' and 'swing'
voters. Partisan voters always vote for their preferred party; it is swing voters who excercise political accountability. He finds that electoral accountability is more effective if there is less 'noise' in voters' decisions, if the electorate is less polarized, and if the competition between parties is more even.
The approach taken here differs from that of Besley (2006) in three important respects. First, the present paper models explicitly the politicians' incentives to manipulate the distribution of voters through 'divisive politics'. Second, the incentives of the opponent politician are for the first time analyzed. Third, the present model abstracts from the adverse-selection problem and concentrates on the core moral-hazard aspect of political accountability, as in the model by Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4) .
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The main results of the paper are derived from the analysis of the politi- cians' incentives to manipulate the distribution of voters prior to the political accountability 'subgame'. Politicians can choose to engage in divisive politics, forcing some independent voters to take sides and become partisan voters of either of the politicians. The result does not merely state that politicians will resort to devisive politics if it brings them an electoral advantage over their opponents (as in Proposition 2 by Besley (2006, p. 127) ). The strategic advantage of 'divisive politics' for the incumbent is that independent voters lose some leverage over the reelection, and therefore have to reduce their demands towards the incumbent. 'Divisive politics' pays off for the incumbent even if most of the direct electoral benefit accrues to the opposition. Moreover, the analysis shows that the opponent gains from divisive politics, too. As the leverage of independent voters decrease, the probability of the opponent winning the election, in equilibrium, also increases.
The next section presents the formal analysis. Between the formal analysis and the conclusion, the robustness of the results to various modifications of the assumptions is analyzed.
Analysis

The framework
Consider an economy with a large number of voters and two politicians, an incumbent A and an opponent B. The incumbent chooses an action e ∈ R + , which we call effort. After e becomes public, an election is held where each voter casts a vote for exacly one of the politicians. Either A or B becomes the winner of the election. (In the tradition of the principal-agent literature, feminine pronouns will apply to the principal (the voter) and masculine pronouns to the agent (the politician).)
Politicians are office-motivated. The winner of the election reveives a rent R. The rent from office may be thought of as 'ego rent' but may also be thought of as reflecting the ability to shape (unmodeled) policy. Apart from this rent, the utility of the incumbent depends on the effort he chooses before the election.
Effort is costly. We can thus summarize the politicians' expected utility as:
where π is the probability that the incumbent gets reelected.
There are three types of voters. A voter van be a 'partisan voter' of either 
None of the results below depend on the simplification that both parties initially have an equal share of partisan voters. The substantive assumption is that independent voters are sometimes pivotal. Positive vote shares are ensured by k < b, and ∆ < 1 − 2b. As a final restriction on the parameters, the analysis concentrates on the case where b + k > 1/2. This assumption means that whatever the independent voters do, both politicians have a positive probability of winning.
After the incumbent makes this decision, but before he makes the effort choice, the independent voters choose (and announce) a 'simple retrospective voting strategy' for the election. 5 A simple retrospective voting strategy is fully described by a threshold level of effortē. By announcingē the independent voters make the non-binding announcement that they will vote for the incumbent if and only if he chooses an effort higher or equal toē. This class of strategies enables the independent voters to attain the highest payoff given the choice of divisive politics by the incumbent politician.
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The sequence of the moves is, thus, as follows: (1) The incumbent chooses whether to engage in divisive politics (D = {0, 1}); (2) The independent voters choose and announce voting strategyē; (3) The incumbent chooses effort e, which is publicly observed; (4) Each voter casts a vote for either A or B. The election winner emerges and payoffs are realized.
5 Such voting strategies, or as they are sometimes referred to, 'simple retrospective voting rules' are discussed in detail by Persson et al. (1997) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) . 6 The next section, dedicated to analyze the robustness of the results to modifications of the assumptions, looks at the case where voters can condition their vote on whether the politician chose divisive politics in the first place. Under weak assumptions this cannot discourage the use of divisive politics. 
Solving the accountability subgame
We solve the game by backward induction. In the last stage, it is always optimal for a partisan voter to vote for her preferred politician. Independent voters, in contrast, are indifferent between the politicians; at the election stage it is weakly optimal for an independent voter to execute the voting strategy she chose at stage (2).
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When choosing the effort level, the incumbent politician compares two relevant alternatives. He gains the votes of independent voters by setting e =ē.
Any effort level higher than that causes additional cost without any electoral gain and is therefore strictly dominated. The relevant alternative is to set e = 0.
Any effort level in the intermediate range e ∈ (0,ē) is more costly without electoral gain and is therefore dominated by zero effort.
The incumbent maximizes his expected payoff according to the formula
To be able to compare the relevant expected payoffs, we first calculate the incumbent's probability of reelection conditional on his effort choice. If he sets e =ē, the independent voters will vote for him. The vote share A receives is thus s A + s 0 , while B gets a vote share s B . Using the identitys A +s B + s 0 = 1, we can express A's reelection probability as
(Note that the continuity of F (.) ensures that ties occur with probability zero.
Thus, the tie-breaking rule does not enter into the decision problem of the 7 Though this is a natural assumption, it is an argument of equilibrium selection. Note that any voting profile chosen by the independent voters constitutes an equilibrium of the election subgame because none of the large number of voters is pivotal with a positive probabbility.
By assuming that independent voters do not deviate from their announced (and optimally chosen) strategy we, in effect, pick the best equilibrium from the independent voters' point of view (for this argument see also Persson et al., 1997 Persson et al., , p. 1171 .
incumbent.) Turning to the alternative, if A chooses e = 0, the independent voters will vote for B. Therefore, the incumbent's reelection probability is
Comparing the payoffs conditional on the choice of effort, we find that the incumbent will choose e =ē (rather than e = 0) if and only if
Intuitively, this relationship can be understood as an incentive constraint: it does not pay for the incumbent to exert more effort than the expected benefit he receives from the independent voters' support. The expected benefit is the increased probability of reelection times the rent in office. The more probable it is that the incumbent wins the election without the independent voters' support (and the less probable it is that he wins the election in spite of receiving their votes) the less effort he is ready to put forward.
When, at stage (2), independent voters contemplate to set the effort thresholdē, they must take this incentive constraint into account. Their utility increases withē up to the level where the politician is indifferent between choosinḡ e and zero effort. If the thresholdē exceeds that level, the incumbent prefers to choose zero effort and the independent voters' utility falls to zero. Therefore, independent voters will setē in a way to make the incumbent's incentive condition bind. In effect, the incumbent receives an expected utility equal to his 'outside option': the expected payoff he receives after zero effort and no support from independent voters. Independent voters are able to extract the full rent differential the incumbent receives by their support. We can summarize the results so far in Lemma 1 Consider the accountability subgame starting in stage (2) of the game. In equilibrium, independent voters set the reelection threshold
The incumbent sets e =ē and gets reelected with probability π = F 1 2 −s B .
Divisive politics in equilibrium
At the first stage of the game, the incumbent politician decides whether to engage in divisive politics. Expecting equilibrium behavior in the subgame starting at stage 2, his expected payoff is:
Now we can turn to the question how this expected payoff is affected by divisive politics. Divisive politics (D = 1) increasess A , increasess B and reduces s 0 . Thus, according to the last expression, it unequivocally increases the expected payoff of the politician for the whole range of possible parameter values ∆ ∈ (0, 1 − 2b) and λ ∈ (0, 1). We can now state the main result of the analysis.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the incumbent politician chooses to engage in
divisive politics (D = 1) for all parameter values ∆ ∈ (0, 1 − 2b) and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Perhaps surprisingly, the incumbent has an incentive to engage in divisive politics even if it overwhelmingly benefits the opponent (that is, even if λ is very close to zero). To see the intuition of this result, consider the incumbent's expected equilibrium payoff. As was shown, this expected payoff equals the incumbent's 'outside option' at the effort stage, that is, his expected utility after setting e = 0. The value of the outside option, however, depends solely on the probability that the incumbent's partisan voters are in absolute majority. All independent and B-partisan voters vote against the incumbent after e = 0; any redistribution between these voter groups is inconsequential for A's equilibrium expected payoff. Thus, he will engage in divisive politics even if it benefits the opponent more than himself. 
An extension: Divisive politics by the opponent
We have seen that it is in the interest of the incumbent to divide the independent voters. It may be interesting to ask whether the opponent politician B has the opposite interest. To operationalize this, consider a modification of the game analyzed above. In stage (1) Otherwise the expected share of partisan voters iss A =s B = b. The political accountability subgame (stages (2) to (4) 
Since π(ē) = F This result shows that the interests of the incumbent and the opponent are aligned: both benefit if independent voters are turned into partisan voters, however unbalanced the benefits between the two politicians are. In particular, the opponent benefits even when λ is very close to one. The opponent receives a higher expected payoff because, in equilibrium, divisive politics increases the the probability that the incumbent gets removed from office. Remember that in equilibrium the incumbent sets e =ē and he receives the votes of the independent as well as his partisan voters. The opponent wins the election in this case only if his partisan voters are in an absolute majority. This probability is increased even by a very small fraction of independents becoming partisan voters of the opponent.
Relying on the results above, it is possible to make the argument that divisive politics may emerge even under less favorable circumstances. It is a corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 that in a setting where it both politicians must engage in divisive politics for it to become effective and divide independent voters, it is an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies that both politicians indeed choose divisive politics. In that case, divisive politics is a means of collusion of the politicians against the independent voters.
Robustness to modifications of the assumptions
This section discusses five natural modifications of the setup and shows that the conclusions of the main analysis are robust to these modifications.
Independent voters punish divisive politics. Could independent voters discourage divisive politics by committing themselves to vote against the incumbent if he engages in it? It can be shown that, under relatively weak assumptions, this is not the case.
It is true that if all originally independent voters can commit to vote against the incumbent in the case that he chooses to divide, then he has no incentive any more to do so. (He is indifferent then.) However, divisive politics will remain beneficial for the incumbent politician as long as it converts an arbitrarily small share of independent voters to his partisans. This main result is not affected by the behavior of the rest of the independent voters or whether these are able to condition their vote on the use of divisive politics. Surprisingly, it may even harm the independent voters while it is indifferent to the divisive politician.
The reason is that, as we saw, the equilibrium payoff of the incumbent is equal to his 'outside option,' i. e., the payoff he receives if he chooses zero effort and the independent voters vote for the opponent. The politician's outside option is, in turn, not affected if a fraction of independent voters chooses not to vote for him under any circumstances (becoming, in effect, partisan voters of the opponent). The only consequence of such a choice is that the leverage of the rest of the independent voters decreases even further, which forces them to lower their demands even further. In fact, even if some independent voters do announce at the beginning of the game that they will refrain from voting for the incumbent if he chooses divisive politics, this threat is not credible.
Independent voters only value effort. Therefore, once the choice about divisive politics has been made, they are better off to use their leverage to give incentives to the incumbent, rather than to execute their threat and thereby reduce the politician's equilibrium effort.
The politician values the vote share rather than just winning. The analysis was based on the assumption that the incumbent values winning but wants to avoid costly effort. Another possible assumption could be to assume that the politician wants to maximize his vote share while trying to avoid costly effort. This assumption could be captured by specifying the expected utility of the politician as E[vote share] − f (e) where f (.) is a strict monotonically increasing function of effort. This different specification, however, would not change the results of the paper. If there is an arbitrarily small share of voters turned into partisan voters by divisive politics, the value of the incumbent's 'outside option' increases: after zero effort he expects to receive a higher vote share than without divisive politics. Thus, the incumbent's equilibrium expected payoff increases and the independent voters must lower the level of effort they demand in exchange for their support. Also, the opponent's expected vote share, along the equilibrium path, is increased by divisive politics, which keeps him, too, interested in divisive politics.
Divisive politics makes effort costlier. Will the incumbent be discouraged from divisive politics if it makes effort more costly or if it leaves him with less resources left to exert effort? It can easily be shown that this is not the case.
It might be plausible to assume that the same scarce resource (time, attention, etc.) must be utilized for divisive politics and effort. In this case, after divisive politics, there might be an upper bound to the effort the politician can exert.
This will mean, in turn, an upper bound (i. e., a restriction) to the effort independent voters can demand from the incumbent in exchange for their support.
There are two cases then: either this restriction is not binding, in which case the results will not be affected at all, or it is binding, in which case the independent voters are made worse off and the incumbent better off than in the absense of the restriction. In other words, if divisive politics lowers the maximum effort of the incumbent, it will become only the more desirable.
The situation is similar, but not quite the same, if divisive politics makes effort more costly: this will not affect the attractiveness of divisive politics but it will make its consequences worse for the voters. To recall, independent voters set their effort demandē to make the incumbent indifferent between satisfying their demand and zero effort. If effort is more costly, the demanded effort has to be lowered to find that point of indifference. The intuition for this result is more general: if the incumbent can handicap himself before the accountability subgame, he will choose to do it, because less effort can be demanded of him as a consequence.
Divisive politics increases the uncertainty about the electorate. All through the paper it was assumed that the uncertainty about the composition of the electorate is unaffected by divisive politics. It may be plausible, however, to assume that divisive politics increases the uncertainty. Could this make divisive politics less appealing to the incumbent (or the opponent)? To answer this question, we should again consider that the equilibrium payoff of the incumbent is equal to the value of his outside option, i. e., his payoff after zero effort and no support from the independent voters. Suppose that the incumbent expects that, after engaging in divisive politics, his bases A will be below 50%. After zero effort the independent voters will vote for the opponent. The incumbent thus wins the election only if the uncertainty regarding the electorate is resolved in a way that is very favorable to him (more precisely: if ε <s A − 1 2 ). If divisive politics increases uncertainty, extreme values of the shock ε will become more likely. It follows that the probability of winning after zero effort will increase for the incumbent, which means that his 'outside option' will be more valuable.
Thus, in this case, increasing uncertainty will make divisive politics more, not less, attractive for the incumbent. Similarly, divisive politics will become more attractive for the opponent if the vote share of his bases B is below 50%. This is because, along the equilibrium path, independent voters will vote for the incumbent. The opponent can win the election only after an extremely positive shock ε. This event is made more likely by increasing uncertainty.
Interestingly, this logic also points at instances where the dependence of uncertainty from divisive politics makes divisive politics less desirable for the politicians. This is the case if the politician's base is expected to be smaller than 50% and divisive politics decreases uncertainty about the electorate: in this case the two effects of divisive politics have to be weighed against eachother. This will also be the case if the politician's base is expected to exceed 50% and divisive politics increases the uncertainty.
Divisive politics is really about firing up the base. Finally, it could be argued that divisive politics serves more to mobilize, or 'fire up,' a politician's base, rather than to force independent voters to take sides. To be sure, politicians are conscious that it is important to convince their supporters to turn out to vote. This consideration is perfectly compatible with the model described in this paper, to the extent that it might be called a different interpretation of the same model. To see this, consider a possible operationalization of the 'firing-up-the-base' aspect. Suppose that the initial distribution of the voters reflects only those who would turn up to vote anyway. (Indeed, the uncertainty about the partisan voters might just be the uncertainty about who shows up at the polls.) Divisive politics convinces some, previously inactive, partisan voters to take part in the election, thus increasing the number of partisan voters of both politicians. This decreases the share of independent voters in the active electorate. This, in turn, leads to the exact same mechanisms and conclusions as what is presented in the main part of the paper under just one condition: the distribution of the newly activated base voters should not be so unequal as to reduce the vote share of the divisive politician's base. 14 
Conclusion
The analysis has shown that it may be in the interest of both the incumbent and the opponent politician to use divisive politics. Divisive politics forces some independent voters to take sides and thereby reduces their ability to make the incumbent accountable for his actions in the common interest. In the resulting equilibrium, the opponent also benefits from the weakening of political accountability because his election probability increases eventhough the incumbent satisfies the independent voters' demands.
The analysis brings to the fore that political accountability hinges crucially on the presence of independent voters. Accountability is weakened by cleavages in the electorate and even by what could be called the 'market power' of political parties.
